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ADVOCACY ADVERTISING: A QUESTION OF
FAIRNESS AND THE REASONABLE
AGENCY
Broadcasting occupies a unique niche in first amendment law. While
reiterating that radio and television share the constitutional protections
guaranteed the press,' the courts have sanctioned governmental intrusions
into broadcasters' operations which would clearly be unlawful if attempted
against newspapers.2 Foremost of these anomalous intrusions is the fair-
ness doctrine promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) which requires a broadcast licensee to present contrasting views on
any controversial issue of public importance covered in his programming.3
The unobjectionable goal of this policy is to insure that all sides are treated
fairly by licensees. 4 In application, however, the doctrine places the Com-
mission in the constitutionally uncomfortable position of judging broad-
cast content for bias.5
1. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,334
U.S. 131 (1948).
2. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (FCC may re-
quire broadcaster to give reply time to victim of personal attack in his programming) with
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (state statute requiring news-
paper to give space to political candidate attacked in its pages is an unconstitutional intru-
sion into editorial discretion). See also FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting,
98 S. Ct. 2096, 2114-15 (1978).
3. The Commission's fairness doctrine actually imposes a two-fold duty. First, "the
broadcaster must devote a reasonable percentage of. . . broadcast time to the coverage of
public issues" and second, "his coverage of these issues must be fair in the sense that it
provides opportunity for the presentation of contrasting points of view." The Handling of
Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Commu-
nications Act (Fairness Report), 48 F.C.C. 2d 1, 7 (1974). See Report on Editorializing by
Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949), The FCC, however, has seldom investi-
gated a licensee for failing to cover issues. See Patsy Mink, 59 F.C.C. 2d 987 (1976).
4. See Report on Editorializing, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1250 (1949).
5. Appreciating the difficulty of this position, the FCC is prepared to give the judg-
ments of the licensee a great deal of deference, confining its inquiry to whether the broad-
caster's conclusions are reasonable and in good faith. Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C. 2d 1, 13
(1974). Further, even if a licensee is found to have aired biased programming, the manner
in which other views are presented is left entirely to his discretion. Id. at 14. In spite of
this deference broadcasters complain that the fairness doctrine inhibits the presentation of
public issues on the air since a station can never be sure how many other opinions must be
accommodated after a controversial broadcast. See SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE HouSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, THE FAIRNESS Doc-
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The delicacy of this task can become most acute when a controversial
issue is raised in an advertisement. Broadcasters generally screen out
commercials which obviously advocate controversial positions.6 Busi-
nesses, however, have increasingly turned to so-called "advocacy advertis-
ing",7 to sell their social and economic ideas as well as their products.
Therefore, they must tailor their advertising to slip past a licensee's initial
scrutiny. 8 In response to fairness complaints raised by these commercials,
the FCC has not been hesitant to find fairness violations,9 despite its an-
nounced position that it will not disturb a broadcaster's reasonable inter-
TRINE AND RELATED ISSUES, H. REP. No. 91-257, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (hereinafter
cited as HOUSE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE REPORT) (remarks of Dr. Frank Stanton, President of
CBS). Legal commentators have had a more fundamental dispute with the doctrine, seeing
it as an impermissible government intrusion into the prerogatives of the broadcaster. See
Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213; Robinson,
The FCC and the First Amendment." Observations on 40 years of Radio and Television
Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67 (1967). Professor Robinson, author of the last cited article,
is now an FCC Commissioner, but his views on the doctrine do not seem to have changed.
See The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest
Standards of the Communications Act, 58 F.C.C. 2d 691 (1976) [hereinafter Reconsideration
of Fairness Report] (remarks of Commissioner Robinson, dissenting). There have also been
recent moves in Congress to modify the fairness doctrine. For example, Senator Proxmire
has introduced a bill that would abolish the doctrine altogether. See S. 22, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977). The proposed Communications Act of 1978 would also abandon the fairness
doctrine but would replace it with a somewhat similar "equity principle". See H.R. 13015,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 434(a)(2) (1978).
6. Several licensees have alluded to this practice when accused of airing advocatory
commercials. See, e.g., Energy Action Comm., Inc., 64 F.C.C. 2d 787, 792 (1977); Wilder-
ness Soc'y, 30 F.C.C. 2d 643, 644, reconsidered, 31 F.C.C. 2d 729 (1971). To some extent,
these policies appear to be a reaction to the possible fairness complaints such commercials
might inspire. In order to allay these fears, the Mobil Oil Corporation offered to purchase
air time for its critics if a network would run the company's advocatory commercials. No
network accepted the offer. See F. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GuYs, THE BAD GUYS AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 118-20 (1976).
7. Advertising has long been used by businesses in order to project a favorable image
to the public. A general decline in the public's confidence in business in recent years has
made such advertising all the more necessary. The consumers movement, anti-pollution
laws and the energy crisis have put American business in an increasingly defensive posture.
See Note, The Regulation of Corporate Image Advertising, 59 MINN. L. REV. 189, 191 (1974).
Rather than confine their efforts to merely touting their social responsibility or whatever
may be necessary to build a good public image in the current political climate, many corpo-
rations actively have begun taking stances on issues and editorializing about them in the
media. See Weaver, Corporations are Defending Themselves with the Wrong Weapon, FOR-
TUNE, June 1977 at 187; Ross, Public Relations Isn't Kid-Glove Stuff at Mobil, FORTUNE,
Sept. 1976 at 106.
8. The bulk of advocacy advertising is carried in the less restrictive print media. A
corporation, however, may run toned-down versions of its ads on television to reinforce the
hard-sell of its other advertisements. See, e.g., Energy Action Comm. Inc., 64 F.C.C. 2d
787, 789 (1977); Wilderness Soc'y, 30 F.C.C. 2d 643, 645 (1971).
9. See Public Media Center, 59 F.C.C. 2d 494 (1976), reconsideration denied, 64 F.C.C.
2d 615 (1977); Energy Action Comm., Inc., 64 F.C.C. 2d 787 (1977).
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pretation of such advertisements as non-controversial.10
The differing treatment accorded print and electronic media is usually
explained as a consequence of the limited range of frequencies available
for broadcasting." Since the number of potential stations is finite, some
of those who might want to broadcast will be denied access to the air-
waves. The Communications Act requires that the choice among compet-
ing applicants for broadcast licenses must be made according to who will
best serve the public interest.' 2 Early in its regulation of electronic media,
the FCC decided that the public interest would not be served by the licen-
see who monopolized the airwaves with a particular point of view. 13
Therefore, it made the objective treatment of issues a condition of licens-
ing.
The Commission's interpretation of its duties received a broad endorse-
ment in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 4 The Supreme Court empha-
sized that the public's right to be informed was an important element of
the public interest standard and, in some circumstances, outweighed the
licensee's interest in expressing his views. 15 In a subsequent case, the
Court seemed to give a new dimension to the rights of broadcasters and
may have shifted the first amendment balance espoused in Red Lion.16
This thinking seems to have swayed the circuit courts hearing appeals of
FCC decisions, since they have subsequently called for the Commission to
10. See Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C. 2d 1, 24 (1974).
11. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943). Other justifications for the
regulation of content in broadcasting have been offered but have not gained widespread
acceptance. Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit has suggested that a differ-
ent first amendment approach might be permissible, because broadcasting's pervasive im-
pact requires the unwilling listener to take affirmative action to avoid what he does not wish
to hear. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969). To some extent, the Supreme Court relied on the intrusive nature of radio in uphold-
ing special restrictions on indecent language in broadcasting. See FCC v. Pacifica Founda-
tion, 98 S. Ct. 3026, 3040 (1978).
12. 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1970).
13. See Mayflower Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1941); Great Lakes Broadcasting
Co. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 3 F.R.C. ANN. REP. 32 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37
F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
14. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
15. "It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here." Id. at 390.
16. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). See Comment, The Reg-
ulation of Competing First Amendment Rights .4 New Fairness Doctrine Balance After CBS,
122 U. PENN. L. REV. 1283 (1974); notes 57-60 and accompanying text infra. Despite the
uncertainty introduced by CBS, the Supreme Court has not abandoned the RedLion inter-
pretation of broadcasters' speech rights. The Court has most recently used the case to up-
hold the FCC's cross-ownership rules forbidding newspaper owners from holding broadcast
licenses in their main circulation areas. See FCC v. Nat'l Citizen's Comm. for Broadcast-
ing, 98 S. Ct. 2096, 2114-15 (1978).
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play a more limited role in fairness cases. 17
The FCC has, at least ostensibly, always sought the most limited role
possible in imposing the fairness obligations. Its first formal articulation of
the doctrine amounted to little more than a statement of agency preference
with scant reference to the manner of application or enforcement of the
policy.' 8 Subsequent fairness decisions did little to clarify the doctrine,
since the Commission dealt with each case on an ad hoc basis to avoid the
appearance of imposing standards on licensee judgment.' 9 This ap-
proach, however, eventually backfired. In trying to make sense out of the
seemingly random fairness decisions, the circuit courts extended the doc-
trine into areas in which the FCC would have preferred not to venture,
particularly in applying the fairness doctrine to product commercials. 20
To stem the distortion of its doctrine, the Commission began a long-
range inquiry into the problem 2' and, in 1974, issued the Fairness Report22
which evaluated the fairness doctrine generally and paid particular atten-
tion to the use of the doctrine in advertising. The FCC announced that
only commercials which obviously took a position in a controversy would
give rise to a fairness obligation. 23 Recognizing the subtlety of advertis-
ing, however, the Commission left open the possibility that a commercial
might obviously address an issue without explicitly mentioning it.24 At
the same time, the Commission averred that it would not disturb the rea-
sonable, good faith judgment of a licensee 25 when the thrust of an adver-
tisement is open to interpretation. Given the circuit court narrowing of
the agency's role in the fairness doctrine, the Commission's review of a
broadcaster's judgment would seem even more limited. Since the Fairness
17. See Georgia Power Project v. FCC, 559 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1977); Straus Communi-
cations, Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1976); NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976).
18. See Report on Editorializing, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1270 (1949) (dissenting views of
Commissioner Hennock). See notes 37-40 and accompanying text infra.
19. Id. at 1251.
20. See Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Retail Store Em-
ployees Union v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
21. See Notice of Inquiry, 30 F.C.C. 2d 26 (1971); notes 75-77 and accompanying text
infia.
22. 48 F.C.C. 2d 1 (1974).
23. Id. at 26.
24. Id. at 23. In the Commission's formulation, this would be true when the advertise-
ment expressed views closely paralleling the views of partisans on an issue. As an example,
the FCC used an oil company ad which asserted that rapid development of Alaskan oil
reserves was necessary to meet the country's energy demands. Since this was an argument
in favor of building the Alaskan pipeline, the commercial would take a position on that
issue. Id See Wilderness Soc'y, 30 F.C.C. 2d 643 (1971).
25. Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C. 2d at 24.
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Report, the FCC has nonetheless questioned the judgments of several
broadcasters who have aired arguably controversial commercials.
I. THE SEARCH FOR GOVERNMENT REGULATION WITHOUT
GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE
A. The Development of the Fairness Doctrine
At one time, broadcasting was, for all practical purposes, totally unregu-
lated.26 The airwaves were open to anyone with the desire and finances to
build a radio transmitter. The result, as might be expected, was chaos.
Stations switched frequencies and boosted transmitter power at will, re-
gardless of whether they interfered with other broadcasters.2 7 The situa-
tion cried out for supervision and Congress responded with the Radio Act
of 1927, which gave the Secretary of Commerce the authority to prevent
interference between stations by licensing them to specific frequencies.28
Even at that early date, Congress recognized that broadcasters were enti-
tled to first amendment protection.29 Congress, however, was also mind-
ful of the power of the broadcaster to mold public opinion and particularly
frightened at the prospect of a licensee giving a favored candidate an inor-
dinate amount of exposure around election time.30 Accordingly, the Ra-
dio Act contained a provision which limited broadcaster freedom by
requiring that equal time be made available to opponents, should a candi-
date be allowed to use station facilities. 3'
While Congress also appreciated the danger inherent in giving a govern-
ment agency extensive control over a communications medium, 32 it none-
26. Congress had passed the Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (later repealed, it
was codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 51-63), giving the Secretary of Commerce the power to license
and regulate radio stations. His authority to license, however, was interpreted as purely
ministerial and he was compelled to grant licenses even though there were no available
frequencies. See Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923), cer. dismissed,
266 U.S. 636 (1924). A later case determined that Congress had withheld from the Secre-
tary the power to make radio regulations. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614
(N.D. Ill. 1926).
27. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 69-70.
28. Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (current version at 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-99 (1970)).
29. See 67 CONG. REc. 5480 (1926) (remarks of Reps. White & LaGuardia). The Ra-
dio Act contained a provision that nothing in the statute could be construed as permitting
censorship of broadcasters. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 18, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (current
version at 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970)).
30. See H. R. REp. No. 404, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926).
31. See Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 18, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (current version at 47
U.S.C. § 315 (1970)).
32. The previous two Congresses had tried to pass radio legislation but had failed be-
cause of disagreements over how much power the regulatory body should have. See H. R.
REP. No. 464, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926).
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theless conferred wide discretion on the Secretary and the Federal Radio
Commission in licensing stations. Borrowing from the Transportation Act
of 1920, 33 the Radio Act made "public interest, convenience, and neces-
sity" 34 the broad standard by which licensees would be judged. Aware of
Congress' political misgivings, the Commission stated in an early opinion
that allowing "only a one-sided presentation of the political issues of a
campaign would contravene this public interest standard. 35" The forerun-
ner of the FCC thus began an independent policy of fairness in broadcast-
ing that has continued. 36
The Commission took a progressively stricter view of opinionating on
the airwaves after its first policy statement. The constrictive trend became
most apparent in 1940 when the FCC ruled that broadcasters could not
editorialize at all on the air.37 Although the ruling went unchallenged, the
Commission changed the policy in 1949 when it released the Report on
Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees.38 Reversing its previous rulings, the
FCC announced that the presentation of opinions was not inconsistent
with the broadcaster's duty to the public interest.39
The Commission, however, was still unwilling to give licensees free rein.
The Report on Editorializing described the right of the public to be in-
formed as a dominant component of the public interest standard. 40 In
order to accommodate this interest, the FCC imposed a general require-
ment of fairness in the treatment of issues.4' A licensee who presented an
editorial would be obliged to seek out proponents of contrasting view-
33. Ch. 91, § 402(18), 41 Stat. 456 (1920) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1(18) (1970)).
See F. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 19.
34. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 4, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (current version at 47 U.S.C. §
307(d) (1970)).
35. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 3 F.R.C. ANN. REP. 32
(1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
36. The Radio Act of 1927 was repealed and reenacted as Title III of the Communica-
tions Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-99 (1970). At the same time, the Federal Radio Commission
became part of the Federal Communications Commission, but the FRC's policies were con-
tinued.
37. See Mayflower Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1941). Mayflower, applying for a
license held by the Yankee Network, charged that Yankee had broadcast editorials urging
the election of certain candidates. The Commission stated that it was against the public
interest for a licensee to use his broadcast facilities for his own partisan ends and only re-
newed Yankee's license after it promised to refrain from editorializing.
38. 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
39. Id. at 1252-53.
40. The Commission based this theoretical interest on Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1 (1945), in which the Supreme Court had stated that the goal of the first amend-
ment was the "widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources" and had held that the federal government could act affirmatively to insure that
private combinations did not impede this flow. Id. at 20.
41. Report on Editorializing, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257-58 (1949).
[Vol. 27:785
Advocacy Advertising
points and ensure that these opinions were heard.42 The Commission
planned to enforce this obligation by evaluating the broadcaster's overall
handling of issues when his license came before the agency for renewal or
modification.43
Once again the Commission's licensing standard escaped judicial scru-
tiny. The fairness doctrine did, however, gain an added measure of re-
spectability in 1959 when Congress amended the equal time provision of
the Communications Act. 44 Reacting to a controversial section 315 ruling
by the FCC,45 Congress altered the Act to exempt appearances on bona
fide newscasts from the equal time requirement. 46 Still suspicious of
broadcasters, however, Congress added the caveat that the amendment in
no way absolved broadcasters from their general obligation to treat candi-
dates and issues fairly, an apparent recognition of the agency's fairness
doctrine.47
Despite its new importance, the fairness doctrine remained a poorly un-
derstood and frequently ignored obligation. To remind licensees of its
42. Id. at 125 1. Even at this first formulation of the fairness doctrine, it was assailed as
overly vague and infringing on the free speech rights of broadcasters, Id. at 1259-70 (views
of Commissioner Jones).
43. Id. at 1255. In 1962, the FCC changed this policy and began judging fairness
problems as they arose. See FCC v. NBC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1115 & n.54 (1974), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 910 (1976); Honorable Oren Harris, 40 F.C.C. 582 (1963).
44. Act of September 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, § 1, 73 Stat. 557 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 315 (1970)).
45. In its original form § 315 read "if any license shall permit any person who is a
legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford
equal opportunities to all other such candidates..." ch. 652, § 315, 48 Stat. 1088 (1934).
Lar Daly, a candidate in a Chicago mayoral primary, complained that several television
stations in his area had carried news stories of his oppponent, incumbent Richard Daley,
greeting foreign dignitaries and kicking off the annual March of Dimes Drive. The FCC
ruled that these were "uses" within the meaning of § 315 and ordered the stations to give Lar
Daly equal time. See Interpretive Opinion, 26 F.C.C. 715, 741-43 (1959).
46. The amendments exempted from § 315's equal time requirements any "(1) bona
fide newscast, (2) bona fide news interview, (3) bona fide news documentary . or (4) on-
the-spot coverage of bona fide news events." 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970).
47. "Nothing in the foregoing . . . shall be construed as relieving broadcasters .
from the obligation . . . to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting
views on issues of public importance." 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970). The purpose of this
caveat was made clear in the committee report on the bill which stated "the committee is not
unmindful that the class of programs being exempted from the equal time requirements
would offer a temptation as well as an opportunity for a broadcaster to push his favorite
candidate and exclude others." S. REP. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1959). As a
further precaution, the amendments provided that Congress would examine a broadcaster's
performance under the new law and reconsider the amendment if necessary. See Pub. L.
No. 86-274, § 2(a), 73 Stat. 557 (1959). A Freedom of Communication Subcommittee was
set up to monitor licensees and make recommendations. See S. Res. 305, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess., 106 CONG. REC. 12516-22 (1960). The subcommittee recommended no changes. See
108 CONG. REC. 7006-10 (1962).
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requirements, the FCC distributed a digest of fairness rulings called the
Fairness Primer.48 Although the digest did clarify the main issues in a fair-
ness inquiry-whether the broadcast has raised a controversial issue of
public importance and whether the licensee has presented only one side of
that issue without offering reasonable opportunity for presentation of con-
trasting viewpoints-the Primer also revealed the ad hoc approach to ad-
judication of fairness disputes.49
To achieve uniformity, the FCC used the Fairness Primer to publicize
more formal requirements on licensees. Whenever a broadcaster engaged
in a personal or political attack over the air, he would have to provide a
transcript of the program to the person attacked as well as give him an
opportunity to reply.!° It was in this form that the fairness doctrine was
finally challenged in court, and the Commission could not have asked for
a better vehicle for winning approval of its policy.
The specific violation involved a broadcast by the Reverend Billy James
Hargis in which the right-wing fundamentalist vilified an author of an arti-
cle about him.5' The station failed to send the required transcripts or of-
fer rebuttal time and refused to do- so even after the author complained.52
On being informed of the matter, the FCC sent a letter to the licensee
admonishing him that he had violated the fairness doctrine. The broad-
48. 40 F.C.C. 598 (1964). Fairness violations had generally been a matter between the
Commission and the licensee. During the early sixties, however, a number of Deep South
broadcasters had been using their stations to present segregationist views and totally ignored
the viewpoints of blacks. See Columbus Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 568 (1963); Rebel
Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 566 (1963); Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 556 (1963).
Concerned over the flaunting of its rules, the FCC sent a Public Notice to all licensees
reminding them of the basic requirements of the fairness doctrine. See Stations' Responsi-
bilities Under the Fairness Doctrine, 40 F.C.C. 571 (1963). Because of the complexity of the
policy, however, the FCC found it necessary to issue the more detailed Fairness Primer.
49. The Fairness Primer reported rulings that had held such subjects as fluoridation and
the nutritive qualities of white bread controversial, but it did not attempt to explain those
findings. Some of the rulings are particularly obscure. In one instance, the Commission
staff ruled that a program attacking Communism did not require the broadcaster to present
the contrasting views of Communists but did oblige him to seek out those who had differing
views on how to combat Communism. 40 F.C.C. 598, 603-04.
50. Id. at 610-14. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, .300, .679 (1977).
51. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 371, n.2 (1969). A great deal of
Red Lion's programming consisted of right-wing commentary like that of Hargis. Air time
for these shows was purchased by their producers, thereby providing the station with reve-
nue. See F. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at I-11.
52. The broadcaster argued that since the author had originally attacked Hargis in
print, the station did not owe him a reply. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 1 F.C.C. 2d 1587
(1965), aff'd, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The victim of the attack, Fred Cook, had heard of the
broadcast and contacted each of the stations which had carried it. Although many of the
stations refused his request for reply time, Red Lion was the only broadcaster that Cook
pursued. See F. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 43-44.
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caster appealed the letter to the Supreme Court, but in Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC,53 the Court found nothing objectionable in the
Commission's action. Reviewing the legislative history of the 1959 equal
time amendments, the Red Lion Court held as a matter of law that Con-
gress had approved the FCC's interpretation of the public interest stan-
dard in them.54 The Court was also able to find no constitutional defect
in imposing a general requirement of fairness on broadcasters." It re-
fused to accept the view that broadcasters had unabridgeable first amend-
ment rights56 and held that the fairness doctrine served the greater value
that a multiplicity of voices should be heard.57
By placing the public's right to be informed above any speech interests
of broadcasters, RedLion seemed to suggest that all significant viewpoints
should command access to the airwaves as a matter of right.58 This rea-
soning led the District of Columbia Circuit to rule that a licensee could not
refuse to sell air time for political announcements.5 9 In CBS, Inc. v. Dem-
53. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The Commission had been upheld by the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967), aff'd, 395
U.S. 367 (1969). The FCC's personal attack rules were, however, held unconstitutional by
the Seventh Circuit in another case. Radio Television News Directors Ass'n v. United
States, 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The two cases were joined
together in RedLion.
54. 395 U.S. at 380-84.
55. Id. at 385. The Court noted, moreover, that the purpose behind § 315 could be
subverted by allowing persons other than a candidate to appear, were it not for the duties
imposed by the fairness doctrine. Id. at 382-83.
56. "Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there
are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable first amendment right to
broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." Id. at
388.
57. Id. at 390.
58. Several groups petitioned the FCC for rulings that a licensee could not impose a flat
ban on advertisements that advocated a position on issues. The Commission ruled that a
broadcaster was not required to accept all advertising, as broadcasters are not common car-
riers. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 29 F.C.C. 2d 216 (1970) and Business Executives Move for
Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C. 2d 242 (1970), joined & affd sub nom. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). See 47 U.S.C. § 153(h)(1970); Jaffee, The Editorial Re-
sponsibility of the Broadcaster. Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768
(1972).
59. Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 650 (D.C. Cir.
1971), rev'd sub nom, CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). The court
specifically held that a broadcaster could not refuse to air editorial advertisements when he
already has accepted other types of advertising. 450 F.2d at 646. Because the Commission
required such bans, the broadcasters' actions were viewed as state action. 450 F.2d at 651-
52. Rejection of advertising for its specific speech content was thus seen as an impermissi-
ble discrimination based on the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. 450 F.2d at
654-58. The opinion noted the first amendment rights of broadcasters as a countervailing
interest but considered its weight minimal when only the selection of advertising was in-
volved. 450 F.2d at 664.
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ocrauic National Committee,60 however, the Supreme Court rejected this
argument. Examining the history of radio regulation, the Court concluded
that Congress intended broadcasters to have as much journalistic freedom
as possible.6 ' Although licensees have a duty under Red Lion to inform
the public, the manner in which this is accomplished should be determined
by the broadcaster.62 A right of access would undermine journalistic free-
dom63 and would inevitably draw the FCC into an unhealthy supervision
of broadcast operations.64
Despite its recognition of Red Lion, CBS precipitated an erosion of the
fairness doctrine.65 The decision's emphasis on the rights of broadcasters
left little room for the Commission to dispute their judgments. This new
relationship was sharply illustrated by the District of Columbia Circuit in
NBC v. FCC.66 The case grew out of a complaint that an NBC documen-
tary had attacked all private pension plans. 67 NBC responded that the
broadcast had merely chronicled some of the problems involved in pen-
sions without passing any overall judgment.68 After reviewing the pro-
gram, however, the Commission concluded that "it would strain the most
'permissive standard of reasonableness' past the breaking point to imply
that the program was confined to such a limited examination. '69 In spite
of this extreme characterization, the circuit court still ruled on appeal that
the network's contention was too reasonable to be questioned by the
agency. 70 Subsequent fairness cases have echoed this deferential treat-
60. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
61. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, felt that one of the basic purposes of the
Communications Act was to insure that broadcasters have broad discretion in the treatment
of issues. Id. at 110.
62. Id at 11. The public's right to be informed is a strong competing interest, but it
was not seen as an absolute and, accordingly, must be balanced. Id. at 102. Cf 412 U.S.
at 124, in which the Court discussed the role of the broadcaster when the fairness doctrine
applies to editorial advertising.
63. Id. at 124. Since a broadcaster would still have to insure that all viewpoints were
presented on his station, a considerable part of the broadcast day would have to be reserved
for balancing out the views expressed in editorial advertisements. Id.
64. Id. at 126-30. The Chief Justice was further concerned that any system of access
would be heavily weighted in favor of the wealthy who could afford to buy air time. Id. at
123-24.
65. See Comment, Growing Deference to the Broadcaster's First Amendment Rights,
1976 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 399.
66. 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976).
67. Accuracy in Media, Inc., 40 F.C.C. 2d 958 [Broadcast Bur.] reconsideration denied,
44 F.C.C. 2d 1027 (1973), yacated, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
68. 516 F.2d at 959.
69. Accuracy in Media, Inc., 44 F.C.C. 2d 1027, 1040 (1973).
70. NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1125-26 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910
(1976). The NBC case was ultimately vacated as moot with the passage of pension reform
laws. Id. at 1180-81. Subsequent opinions, however, have cited NBC for its interpretation
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ment of broadcasters' interpretations. 7'
B. Fairness and Commercials
Although practically every aspect of the fairness doctrine has stimulated
debate, the use of the policy in connection with advertising has resulted in
an unusual amount of controversy. Long before it actually applied the fair-
ness doctrine to an advertisement, the Commission considered the possibil-
ity that a commercial message could raise the obligation to present
contrasting viewpoints.72 The delay, however, did not breed caution, for
the first fairness ruling dealing with advertising was one of the FCC's most
radical. John Banzhaf petitioned the Commission for a ruling that ciga-
rette commercials raised the controversial issue of the propriety of smok-
ing and, because of the unique presentation involved, fairness required the
broadcast of an equal number of anti-smoking spots. 73 The FCC refused
to acquiesce in all of Banzhaf's thinking, but nevertheless did rule that
cigarette advertising in general raised a public health controversy, and that
a licensee who did not air some sort of anti-smoking programming would
be delinquent in his duties to the public interest.
74
The impact of the decision was not lost on environmentalists and other
special interest groups that petitioned the Commission to make similar rul-
ings regarding other products.75 The FCC adamantly maintained, how-
ever, that the cigarette ruling was sui generis and refused their requests.
76
Nevertheless, much to the Commission's chagrin, the District of Columbia
Circuit was unable to see any significant differences in the products in-
volved, and held that advertisements for high-powered cars and high-oc-
tane gasoline raised environmental issues about which broadcasters were
of the fairness doctrine. See Straus Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001, 1008 n.16
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
71. The D.C. Circuit has called for a higher degree of scrutiny in fairness decisions than
is usually applied by courts in reviewing agency determinations. See Straus Communica-
tions, Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Conversely, other courts have
stated that when the Commission has upheld a licensee's judgment, reversal will only come
in the most unusual cases. Georgia Power Project v. FCC, 559 F.2d 237, 240 (5th Cir. 1977).
72. See Sam Morris, 11 F.C.C. 197 (1946).
73. WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C. 2d 381, reconsideration denied, 9 F.C.C. 2d 921 (1967), aff'd
sub nom. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1968).
74. 8 F.C.C. 2d at 382. The Commission declared at the time that it knew of no other
product which aroused the same governmental health concerns. See WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.
2d 921, 943 (1967). The FCC's resolution of the complaint was upheld in Banzhaf v. FCC,
405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1968).
75. See Alan F. Neckritz, 29 F.C.C. 2d 807 (1971) (gasoline); Friends of the Earth, 24
F.C.C. 2d 743 (1970) (high-test gasoline and high-performance automobiles).
76. 29 F.C.C. 2d 807.
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obliged to present contrasting views.77
The FCC did not concur with these holdings,78 but instead announced
that it was beginning a broad inquiry into all aspects of the fairness doc-
trine, with particular attention to product advertising. 79 The announce-
ment caused enough uncertainty among the circuit courts to prevent
further extensions of the doctrine in commercial cases.8 0 Meanwhile, the
Commission set about finding applications of the fairness doctrine with
which it felt more comfortable.
The first advertising fairness violation found after the Notice of Inquiry
indicated the direction in which the FCC would go. Unlike the advertise-
ments in previous cases, the Esso commercial involved was aimed at creat-
ing a favorable public image for the advertiser. The advertisement
discussed the technological problems of drilling for oil in the Arctic cold
and the progress Esso was making in protecting the tundra environment. 81
Wilderness Society, the complainant in the case, asserted that the ads
urged quick construction of the Alaska pipeline, although this argument
could only be inferred from the commercials. 82 To make the connection,
the Society pointed to various print ads that Esso had run which were
more openly advocatory.83  Surprisingly, the Commission did not seem to
demand any more in the way of proof before agreeing that the Esso com-
77. See Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The D.C. Circuit
seemed to extend the fairness doctrine beyond product commercials with public health con-
sequences when it instructed the Commission to hold a hearing on whether advertisements
urging patronage of a department store raised a controversial issue when a union local was
organizing a boycott of that store. See Retail Store Employees Union v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
78. The Commission reconsidered the Neckritz complaint after the Friends ofthe Earth
decision but refused to follow the opinion. See Alan F. Neckritz, 37 F.C.C. 2d 528 (1972).
79. Notice of Inquiry, 30 F.C.C. 2d 26 (1971).
80. E.g. Neckritz v. FCC, 502 F.2d 411, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Commissioner Johnson
charged that the Notice of Inquiry was solely an attempt to delay pending court decisions.
Notice of Inquiry, 30 F.C.C. 2d 26, 35 (1970) (Johnson concurring).
81. See Wilderness Soc'y, 30 F.C.C. 2d 643, reconsidered, 31 F.C.C. 2d 729 (1971).
82. The complaint involved three Esso commercials aired during "Meet the Press."
The first ad explained some of the costs involved in drilling on the North Slope of Alaska,
but argued that the costs were well worth it because of the need for oil. The second asserted
that Esso's experience in drilling in the Canadian Artic had taught it how to search for oil
without harming the environment. In the third commercial, Esso told of certain grasses it
had developed to replant in construction areas. Wilderness Society claimed that these ad-
vertisements raised "(1) the need of developing Alaskan oil reserves quickly and (2) the
capability of the oil companies to develop and transport that oil without environmental
damage." 30 F.C.C. 2d at 643-44. NBC, which carried the ads, argued that the commer-
cials were indistinguishable from advertisements to which the FCC had refused to extend
the fairness doctrine in Friends of the Earth, 24 F.C.C. 2d 743 (1970). See Wilderness
Soc'y, 30 F.C.C. 2d at 644.
83. Id. at 645.
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mercials presented a viewpoint on a controversial issue. The FCC further
held that the balanced treatment of the pipeline issue in other program-
ming did not offset the views expressed in the commercials. 84  Accord-
ingly, it required the network which broadcast the ads to show what steps
it would take to balance the presentation. 85
On rehearing, however, the Commission seemed to retreat from its posi-
tion, ruling that an eight minute interview with an environmentalist on the
"Today" show adequately balanced out the views expressed in the series of
ads.86 Subsequent advertisement decisions demanded increasingly strin-
gent documentation of controversiality, 87 and seemed to put the burden
entirely on the complainant to prove that the licensee had never presented
contrasting views on the subject. 88
II. THE "EDITORIAL ADVERTISEMENT"
Although the long-awaited Fairness Report89 did not herald any sub-
stantial change in the treatment of commercials, it did clarify the position
the FCC had been taking. The Commission would no longer consider
fairness complaints in connection with straight product commercials be-
cause these advertisements did not discuss controversial issues in any
meaningful way.90 The Report, however, recognized that some commer-
cials did consist of direct commentary on issues and held out the possibil-
ity of applying the fairness doctrine to them. The FCC further noted that
many of these "editorial advertisements" did not explicitly address the is-
sues on which they commented.9' Using the Esso commercials from Wil-
84. Id. at 646.
85. Id.
86. 31 F.C.C. 2d 729, 733 (1971).
87. See Dr. John DeTar, 32 F.C.C. 2d 933 (1972). Complainant tried to show that an-
nouncements advocating family planning raised the issue of whether overpopulation was a
serious threat in the United States. The Commission ruled, however, that the articles pro-
duced on the subject showed nothing more than a conflict between experts. Id. at 934.
88. See Wilderness Soc'y, 41 F.C.C. 2d 103 (1973). The FCC Broadcast Bureau had
rejected a complaint by the Society because it had failed to prove that the network had not
broadcast contrasting views. Perhaps relying on its own experience, the Wilderness Society
charged that the FCC was demanding a higher level of documentation than in previous
cases. Id. at 104. The Commission, however, insisted that it used the same standard in
every case. Id. at 106. See generally Simmons, Commercial Advertising and the Fairness
Doctrine: The New F C C. Policy in Perspective, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1089-1100 (1975);
Comment, supra note IS, at 1293-13 10.
89. 48 F.C.C. 2d 1 (1974).
90. Id. at 24-26. The Commission has been upheld in imposing this limitation on fair-
ness complaints. See Nat'l Citizen's Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 2820 (1978).
91. 48 F.C.C. 2d 1, 22-23.
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derness Society as an example,92 the Commission explained that a test in
these instances would be whether the advertisement expressed views
closely parallelling those held by partisans on an issue.93 The FCC cau-
tioned, however, that no matter how close the views were, it would not
dispute the reasonable, good faith judgment of a licensee that no contro-
versial issue was raised.94
Subsequent to issuance of the Fairness Report, the Commission's posi-
tion was further clarified in two cases. In the first, the Public Media
Center brought a complaint against thirteen Northern California radio sta-
tions for airing several Pacific Gas and Electric Company spots.95 The
ads asserted that nuclear power plants were environmentally safe and that
it was imperative that they be developed as soon as possible in order to
meet the demand for energy.96 Public Media Center asserted that since
Californians were being asked to sign petitions to put nuclear construction
to a referendum at the time, the advertisements made it more difficult for
referendum proponents to gather signatures.97 Several of the accused
licensees countered that the commercials did not meaningfully address the
issue. One offered that nuclear power could not be considered controver-
sial in its service area since the issue had not been mentioned by commu-
nity leaders in ascertainment surveys.98 The Commission, swayed by the
complainants' evidence of "vigorous" debate over the issue both in Con-
gress and in the state, ruled that the broadcasters could not reasonably
contend that the subject was not controversial.99
In Energy Action Committee, Inc. 00 the judgment was a bit more diffi-
92. Id. at 23. See note 79 and accompanying text, supra.
93. Id. at 24.
94. The Commission indicated that it was not interested in a "subjective judgment as to
the advertiser's actual intentions" but in "obvious participation in public debate." Accord-
ingly, it only asked licensees to make a "common" sense judgment about the thrust of the ad
and would only rule against them when "the facts are so clear that the only reasonable
conclusion would be to view the 'advertisement' as a presentation on one side of a specific
public issue." 48 F.C.C. 2d at 23-24. See Simmons, supra note 85, at 1102-03.
95. Public Media Center, 59 F.C.C. 2d 494 (1976), reconsideration denied, 64 F.C.C. 2d
615 (1977).
96. 59 F.C.C. 2d at 495.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 515. Seven of the thirteen licensees contended that the ads did not take a
position on a controversial issue. Id. at 499-509. It was difficult for them, however, to
argue that the announcements were noncontroversial, since each one carried the tag line
"Nuclear power. It isn't the power source of the future. It's the solution to the electrical
energy problem now." Id. at 513.
99. Id. at 514-15. The Commission decided whether the ads meaningfully and obvi-
ously addressed the issue by reference to arguments made by opponents of nuclear power.
The licensees' interpretation was given no discernable weight in the analysis. Id.
100. 64 F.C.C. 2d 787 (1977).
[Vol. 27:785
Advocacy Advertising
cult to make. The Texaco commercial at issue claimed that the company
was able to operate economically and efficiently because it was involved in
all phases of gasoline marketing from oil drilling to retailing.' 10 Energy
Action Committee complained that the commercials raised a controversial
issue of public importance, since they presented the same arguments made
by opponents of oil company divestiture10 2 at a time when Congress was
debating a bill to require divestiture.
None of the broadcasters named in the complaint denied that divestiture
was a controversial issue. Instead they argued that the spot was merely an
institutional advertisement designed to foster a favorable public image for
the oil company and its operations.'0 3 Energy Action Committee, how-
ever, submitted records indicating that the arguments of anti-divestiture
advocates closely paralleled the views expressed in the ad, 1°4 convincing
the FCC that the spot was indeed partisan. 0 5 Accordingly, the Commis-
sion ordered the broadcasters who had not given extensive coverage to the
issue to detail their plans for balancing the views expressed in the commer-
cial. 106
In neither case did the FCC require the complainants to document their
contention that the broadcasters had not devoted air time to the discussion
of contrasting views in their overall programming. Their burden of proof
was satisfied merely by offering affidavits to the effect that some of their
members were regular viewers or listeners and had not heard or seen op-
posing views covered. 107 The Commission then put the onus on the licen-
see to document any broadcast that would fulfill the fairness obligation.
III. THE PROBLEM OF GOOD FAITH AND REASONABLENESS
Although the Fairness Report declined to offer specific FCC guidelines
for invoking the doctrine,'0 8 some requirements for a successful fairness
101. Id. at 787-88.
102. Id. at 789. Divestiture would require large, vertically-integrated oil companies to
sell off those portions of their operations, such as retailing or refining, that could be run
independently.
103. Id. at 790-92.
104. Id. at 789.
105. Id. at 801. The Commission noted that the ad referred to companies "like Texaco"
in extolling the virtues of vertical integration, but allowed that even without this reference it
would consider the ad partisan. Id.
106. Id. at 803. Commissioner White dissented, noting that the Commission was giving
more weight to the advertiser's "alleged intent" than to the licensee's judgment. Id. at 804.
107. In Public Media Center, one of the licensees demanded that the Commission di-
vulge the names of these persons to ascertain whether they really were local listeners, but the
FCC refused. 64 F.C.C. 2d 615, 625 (1977).
108. The FCC reiterated its contention from the original Report on Editorializing that
"there can be no one all-embracing formula" for insuring the balanced presentation of is-
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complaint emerge from the subsequent cases. An issue is apparently con-
troversial if it is connected with or the subject of legislation or referen-
dum.'0 9 Whether a particular advertisement takes a position on an issue
can be determined by reference to the statements of partisans on issues or
to other ads that the advertiser has run. 10 A complainant can provide a
reasonable basis for believing that a licensee has not adequately covered
an issue by swearing that he, as a regular viewer, has not seen all sides
aired."' Satisfaction of these criteria will put the burden on the licensee
to prove that the issue is not controversial or that he has treated it fairly in
his overall programming.
But the process by which the Commission decides the main issue in a
fairness inquiry involving an advertisement remains cloudy. Even after a
complainant establishes that the views expressed in an advertisement
closely parallel views held by partisans on an issue, there is still the ques-
tion of whether the commercial is such an obvious attempt at editorializing
that the licensee cannot reasonably offer another interpretation."12 A
broadcaster inadvertently may air a subtly drawn editorial advertisement.
When placed in the context of the debate surrounding a controversial is-
sue, the advocatory nature of commercials, such as the Texaco ad in En-
ergyAction Committee, Inc,'1 3 may indeed seem obvious. Standing alone
as they do when the broadcaster decides whether to air them, these adver-
tisements may seem like ordinary institutional spots.
This dilemma, of course, would not excuse a licensee from his public
interest obligations. If a broadcaster has allowed his station to be used as
a partisan soapbox, then, under Red Lion, he should inform his audience
of all other relevant viewpoints.' 14 After CBS and NBC, however, it is
uncertain how much latitude the FCC has in enforcing this requirement.
sues. Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C. 2d 1, 9 (1974) (quoting Report on Editorializing by Broad-
cast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1251 (1949)).
109. See Public Media Center, 64 F.C.C. 2d 615, 626 (1977). The Commission will look
at a number of factors in determining whether a specific issue is a controversial issue of
public importance requiring a balance of viewpoints. Public importance is based on the
impact of an issue on the community as a whole and can be gauged from the amount of
attention which the issue has received from the media and government officials. Fairness
Report, 48 F.C.C. 2d 1, 11-12 (1974). Controversy depends on the amount of debate an
issue arouses within the community. Id. at 12. The Commission, however, has only ex-
tended a presumption of controversiality to subjects of legislation.
i10. See Public Media Center, 59 F.C.C. 2d 494 (1976), reconsideration denied, 64
F.C.C. 2d 615 (1977); Energy Action Comm., Inc., 64 F.C.C. 2d 787 (1977); Fairness Report,
48 F.C.C. 2d 1, 24 (1974).
111. See note 104 and accompanying text, supra.
112. See Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C. 2d 1, 24 (1974).
113. See note 98 and accompanying text, supra.
114. See notes 50-54 and accompanying text, supra.
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CBS clearly established that the selection of advertising stands on the
same footing as news judgments.' 15 A broadcaster's representations about
the non-controversiality or non-bias of a commercial should be given the
same deference accorded the network's representations in NBC.' 16
Although the Commission has continually maintained that it will not
disturb a licensee's reasonable, good faith interpretation of a commer-
cial, ' 17 its implementation of this standard has not been as deferential as
NBC would require. Those cases in which the FCC has disputed a broad-
caster's claims have apparently turned on the amount of evidence com-
plainants have offered to link the views expressed in commercials with
those of advocates. 1 8 In a less rigorous inquiry, this comparison might
reliably indicate whether a contention is reasonable. The post- CBS fair-
ness cases suggest, however, that a higher degree of unreasonableness must
be proven, perhaps to the point of showing bad faith on the part of the
licensee. 1 19
The FCC has used the deferential NBC standard in other fairness
cases, 120 but it seems reluctant to do so when handling complaints involv-
ing editorial commercials. There may be some justifications for this treat-
ment. Paid editorials present problems not encountered in other
programming. The views expressed in such commercials will usually re-
115. This is particularly true in broadcasting, since under the fairness doctrine, the com-
mercials aired may determine the substance of other programming. See CBS, Inc. v. Dem-
ocratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124 (1973). The same argument can be made for the
publishing media, since space devoted to advertising will mean less space for editorial mat-
ter. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-57 (1974).
116. In NBC, the District of Columbia Circuit suggested that a licensee's judgments in a
fairness inquiry were entitled to the same presumption of regularity which courts accord
administrative agency decisions. See NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976).
117. See Reconsideration of Fairness Report, 58 F.C.C. 2d 691, 697 (1976); Fairness
Report, 48 F.C.C. 2d 1, 9 (1974).
118. See notes 96, 102 & accompanying text, supra.
119. The District of Columbia Circuit characterized the FCC's role as "correcting the
licensee for abuse of discretion". NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cerl.
denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976) (emphasis in original). A subsequent District of Columbia Cir-
cuit case involving the personal attack rule required the FCC not only to respect the licen-
see's judgments as to whether a controversial issue had been raised, but also specified that it
should defer to the broadcaster's interpretation of the rule. See Straus Communications,
Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001, 1010-11 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Comment, supra note 62, at 409-10.
This treatment has led at least one court to describe the Commission's scope of review as a
"bad faith standard." See Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064,
1148 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
120. See, e.g., NBC, 52 F.C.C. 2d 273 (1975), aJJ'd sub noma. National Organization of
Women v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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flect the interests of those who can afford them.' 2' Large advertisers are,
moreover, in a position to pressure commercial broadcasters into carrying
their advocatory ads. Stricter FCC enforcement of the fairness doctrine in
this context protects the public by preventing the airwaves from being
dominated by one point of view and protects broadcasters by enabling
them to resist advertisers without losing their business. 122
IV. CONCLUSION
There is certainly much that can be said in favor of the fairness doctrine.
By seeking to encourage the objectivity that always has been a goal of
journalism, the doctrine will stimulate broadcasters to provide even-
handed coverage of important issues. Were it not for the fairness doc-
trine, some points of view might never be aired. The doctrine, moreover,
is maturing. Objective enforcement standards are rising out of the former
confusion. Ultimately the fairness obligation will become better under-
stood and more closely observed by broadcasters.
But there is still much about the doctrine that is disturbing. Despite the
guidelines which the Commission has formulated, the outcome of a fair-
ness inquiry still depends on how the FCC views the broadcast involved.
No matter how controversial the subject or what the motives of the adver-
tiser may be, the core issue remains whether the licensee has reasonably
concluded that the commercial did not take sides. The question of reason-
ableness does not lend itself readily to standardized judgments. That the
government acts as sole arbiter of the issue exacerbates the problems asso-
ciated with such inherent arbitrariness. As long as the decision rests with
the agency, there is always the risk that the doctrine will be used to censor,
ultimately restricting, rather than expanding, the broadcast of necessary
viewpoints on the airways.
James C. Stewart
121. This is at least one of the reservations which the Supreme Court had about the paid
access system in CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 123.
122. Some broadcasters favor continuation of the fairness doctrine because of this. See
HOUSE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE REPORT, supra note 5, at 25.
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